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Reflections on Sexual Liberty and Equality:




This Essay uses the opportunity to examine Roe v. Wade forty years after it was
decided and Lawrence v. Texas ten years after it was decided as a platform from which
to analyze the status of the civil rights paradigm in American law. A comparison of
the two decisions illustrates an important and new point about how civil rights law
is deployed to achieve very different goals.
What civil rights movements and arguments framed under the rubric of equality do
best, and a project for which the law is perfectly suited, is ending de jure exclusions
and categorical inequalities. the U.S. Supreme Court did precisely that in Lawrence
and it may do that again in a marriage case in the near or distant future. What
civil rights movements and equality arguments do not do so well is dismantling
hierarchies. Roe is importantly different from Lawrence in part because it involved
a far messier, more complex set of hierarchies than were present in the challenge to
sodomy laws.
'the decision in Roe triggered a massive countermobilization by antichoice advocates
both inside and outside of the legal system. Claims of reproductive rights now
seemingly languish in a political stalemate that has changed little in forty years. By
contrast, Lawrence was litigated narrowly, carefully avoiding a challenge to other
laws that criminalize consensual adult sexual acts. No conservatives are demanding
its reversal, but lower courts have seized on the narrowness of its holding, making it
less powerful in challenges to anti LGBT discrimination than was expected when
the decision was announced. this Essay adds to the legal literature an explication of
these points, and argues that the exclusion -hierarchy distinction provides a partial
explanation of why today Lawrence seems a safe precedent, while Roe remains wobbly.
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INTRODUCTION
We, the people, declare today that the most evident of truths-that all
of us are created equal-is the star that guides us still; just as it guided
our forebears through Seneca Falls, and Selma, and Stonewall; just as it
guided all those men and women, sung and unsung, who left footprints
along this great Mall, to hear a preacher say that we cannot walk alone;
to hear a King proclaim that our individual freedom is inextricably
bound to the freedom of every soul on Earth.
-Barack H. Obama, Second Inaugural Address, January 21, 20131
Today, forty years after Roe v. Wade2 and ten years after Lawrence v. Texas,3
we can connect the dots, as President Obama suggested, linking these watershed
U.S. Supreme Court decisions and the social movements that fueled them to the
full panoply of claims for equality under law. Roe and Lawrence fit comfortably in
the heritage of American civil rights culture because they fulfill the noblest as-
pirations of that ethos: to force the state to extend the full moral agency of
citizenship to a disadvantaged social group. That reading stakes their claim to
greatness. But the decisions also differ in an important way. They illustrate two
distinct functions of civil rights movements: to end categorical de jure inequal-
ities, and to dismantle de facto hierarchies.
Lawrence exemplifies the goal of ending categorical inequality, often man-
ifested in the form of blanket exclusion. The antiexclusion aspect of the civil rights
paradigm arose directly and organically from the movement to challenge Jim
Crow segregation laws in the South, the most famous products of which were
Brown v. Board of Education4 and the federal civil rights statutes enacted in the
1960s.
Roe v. Wade, by comparison, illustrates a different and more complex
version of the civil rights paradigm. The very nature of the statute that was struck
down-the criminalization of certain decisions regarding pregnancy-functioned
as a proxy for the subordination of women. The Court in Roe addressed an ex-
clusion that was more de facto than de jure, but the gendering intrinsic to an-
1. President Barack H. Obama, Inaugural Address by President Barack Obama (Jan. 21,2013), available at
http://www.whitehousegov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/.naugural-address-president-barack-obama.
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tiabortion laws was essential to their foundational harm, which was a soft form of
state coercion of motherhood.5
The double anniversary of Roe and Lawrence provides an apt moment to ask
what the history of the two decisions can tell us about the relationship between
the civil rights paradigm and sexuality, how the legacies of Roe and Lawrence
illustrate the differing functions of civil rights claims, and how future legal de-
velopments related to law and sexuality may (or may not) produce greater justice
for sexual minorities.
Additionally, the coincidence of the two anniversaries invites comparison of
the social movements behind each decision. Specifically, today is a prime mo-
ment to ask-in light of what we know about the possibilities, limits, and perils
of the civil rights paradigm-why the political contingency of Roe has persisted
for forty years, even as the controversy over the criminalization at issue in Lawrence
ten years ago has disappeared from public debate. Assertions of reproductive
rights now seemingly languish in a political and legal coma, while popular sup-
port for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights appears to grow at
almost miraculous speed.'
I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS PARADIGM
Whatever the shortcomings of a formal equality model,7 there is an im-
portant cultural reality to the sense of hope and longing that often arises from
invocation of aspirational equality, of which President Obama's speech is merely
one of many examples. Its significance animates Wendy Brown's paraphrasing of
Gayatri Spivak: Civil rights protection is "that which we cannot not want."8 In
the United States, advocates for racial justice created a cultural frame for the idea
of civil rights as well as a doctrinal foundation. In addition to legal arguments,
the civil rights movement produced a scripture-like narrative of triumph and re-
5. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right ofPrivacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 788-91 (1989).
6. See, e.g., Majorie Connelly, Support for Gay Marriage Growing, but US. Remains Divided, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7,2012, http://www.nydmes.com/2012/12/08/usustices-consider-same-sex-marriage-cases-
for-docket.html ("In a Pew poll conducted in October, 49 percent of respondents said they favored
allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally and 40 percent were opposed. Four years earlier, in August
2008, the numbers were just about reversed: 39 percent in favor and 52 percent opposed.").
7. See, e.g., Robin L. West, Tragic Rights. The Rights Critique in theAge of Obama, 53 WM. &MARY
L. REV. 713, 719-23 (2011).
8. Wendy Brown, Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 420, 420
(Wendy Brown &Janet Halley eds., 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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demption that has inspired every American campaign for social justice since the
middle of the twentieth century.9
This narrative now attaches to LGBT rights. Even as older movements
continue the effort to eliminate obstacles based on such factors as race or sex,
LGBT equality is frequently described in such terms as the civil rights question of
our time." Indeed, it was this premise that gave such power to how the president
phrased his support for LGBT equality in his second inaugural address, even
though he was repeating a position that he had stated earlier." The president's
speech places LGBT rights squarely in the civil rights heritage, in implicit equi-
valence to its forebears, and reinforces the idea that LGBT issues are, for better
and for worse, a new generation's most emblematic civil rights claim.
What civil rights movements and arguments framed under the rubric of
equality do best, and a project for which the law is perfectly suited, is ending de
jure exclusions and categorical inequalities. The Supreme Court did precisely that
in Lawrence and it may do that again in a marriage case in the near or distant
future. In the past, when a challenged statute has contained an exclusion or other
absolutist result, the Court has sometimes found a law unconstitutional under
even a weak constitutional standard. 2
What civil rights movements and equality arguments do not do so well is
dismantling hierarchies. Social hierarchies often incorporate exclusions, but they
are more complex and more enduring. Reva Siegel conceptualized the resilience
of stratification systems as "preservation through transformation," a process by
which a legal reform that ends the categorical inequality that is fundamental to a
status regime-such as racial segregation-will nonetheless permit the modern-
9. Cf JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD 2-4, 139-140 (2011) (describing what Balkin calls "the Great Progressive Narrative").
10. E.g., Emily Bazelon, The Civil Rights Case of Our Generation, SLATE (Dec. 7, 2012, 4:56 PM),
http://www.slate.com/artides/news and politics/jurisprudence/2012/12/supreme court to hear ga
y marriage cases thejustices agree to hear windsor.html (reporting on the Supreme Court's decision to
hear two same-sex marriage cases); see, e.g., Editorial, Next Civil Rights Landmark, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/08/opinion/next-civil-rights-landmarLhtml; Chris
Good & Pierre Thomas, Eric Holder. Gay Marriage Is the Next Civil Rights Issue, ABC NEWS (Feb.
28, 2013, 7:00 AM), http'//abcnews.go.con/blogs/politics/2013/02/eric-holder-gay-marriage-is-the-
next-civil-rights-issue (quoting Attorney General Eric Holder); Susan Kelleher, Gregoire: Same-
Sex Marriage '7he Civil Rights Issue of This Generation," SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 6, 2012, 9:50 PM),
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/politicsnorthwest/2012/11/06/gregoire-same-sex-marriage-the-
civil-rights -issue-of-this -generation.
11. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes & Peter Baker, Obama Says Same-Sex Marriage Should Be Legal, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 2012, http'//wwwnytimes.com/2012/05/10/s/politics/obama-says-same-sex-marriage-
should-be-legal.html.
12. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (precluding equal treatment for gays and lesbians
unless state constitution was amended); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) (excluding children not legally in the United States from public schools).
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ization of rationales for inequality, and thus preserve the inequality itself. 3
Blaming disadvantage on cultural factors, such as single-parent households, is an
example of such a modernization. The result is that much of the structure of
racial hierarchy can remain in place, even though the arguments for why such
hierarchy is natural have shifted and narrowed from biological inferiority to the
inferiority of social arrangements.
If we measure the state of sexual freedom by the ending exclusions prong of
the civil rights paradigm, it is in terrific shape. In fact, possibly the greatest gift
from the quasi-mythologized history of civil rights in the 1960s is the sense of the
inevitability of victory over irrational bias. The idea of an American march of
progress toward equality for all now incorporates LGBT issues, to the point that
the single question in the gay marriage debate about which the largest number of
people agree is probably the eventual outcome: Nationwide legalization is in-
evitable. 4 The most solid evidence for the claim of inevitability may be demo-
graphic data showing high levels of support among younger age groups,"5 but the
frame of inevitability for the achievement of formal equality was crucially shaped
by the American experience of a succession of earlier civil rights movements,
especially those seeking to end discrimination based on race, sex, and disability.
If, however, we measure the state of sexual freedom in anti-hierarchy terms,
the conclusion is far less optimistic. The fragility of abortion rights is illustrative.
The Court's decision in Roe, even as reconfigured somewhat more along women's
equality principles in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,16
triggered less an end to exclusion than a protracted forward-backward dance over
how much autonomy women have to make decisions as to the procreative
dimensions of their lives. The result is a weakened form of subordination. As a
formal matter, women can choose to have abortions and the state cannot abso-
lutely prohibit abortion in all circumstances. Access to care, however, remains
highly contested, so that low-income and African-American women, who are
most likely to have an abortion,7 remain at the bottom of this dimension in the
hierarchy of sexuality.
13. See Reva B. Siegel, 'The Rule ofLove": Wfe Beating as Prerogative andPrivay, 105 YALE L.J. 2117,
2175-78 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. See David von Drehle, How Gay Marriage Won, TIME, Mar. 28, 2013, http://swampland.time.
com/2013/03/28/how-gay-marriage-won (describing, in part, the selection of gay marriage as the
Time cover story for that week).
15. See, e.g., Connelly, supra note 6 (noting that "[iun a Gallup poll conducted [November 2012], 73
percent of people between 18 and 29 years old said they favored [same-sex marriage]").
16. 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
17. STANLEY K. HENSHAW & KATHRYN KosT, GUTTMACHER INST., TRENDS IN THE
CHARACTERISTICS OF WOMEN OBTAINING ABORTIONS, 1974 TO 2004, at 12, 14 (2008),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2008/09/18/Report Trends Women Obtaining-Abortions.pdf;
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The dynamics of claiming a subordinated identity creates a process that is
more complex than a linear march to justice. A group's mobilization for civil
rights claims leads directly to legal challenges to formal classifications by the state
that discriminate against the group. As these efforts become more successful, a
parallel social process occurs in which the excluded group or identity is increas-
ingly normalized, becoming more widely viewed as acceptable. Perversely, the
elimination of a dramatic exclusion can make the residual hierarchy appear more,
rather than less, legitimate because the problem of the former irrational exclusion
has been fixed. Thus, for example, the invalidation of sodomy laws may enhance
the apparent reasonableness of laws criminalizing other consensual sexual
conduct-such as nonrisky sex by persons with HIV.
A failure to differentiate these two different projects-ending exclusions
and dismantling hierarchy-can only muddy critical analysis of civil rights cam-
paigns and equality principles. By understanding the limits of each discourse,
scholars and advocates could avoid both naive expectations and underappreciated
achievements.
II. COMPARINGROEANDL4WRENCE
The two cases whose anniversaries we consider illustrate these points.
Lawrence stands as an example of ending a specific exclusion. In that case, the
Supreme Court ruled that states could not criminalize the sexual conduct that
largely defines homosexuality, thus reversing Bowers v. Hardwick." The sodomy
laws struck down in Lawrence had been the basis for courts to rule that, if it was
permissible for a state to criminalize this form of sexual conduct, governments
could surely engage in less draconian forms of adverse treatment, including job
discrimination and denial of custody rights.19 On that reasoning, gay people
stood as almost by definition unequal before the law, lacking in many ways the
essential criterion of citizenship, "the right to have rights."2
The ruling in Lawrence is based on protection of liberty under the Due
Process Clause and not on guarantees under the Equal Protection Clause, but its
most powerful social message has been legitimation of equality for gay people.
Rachel K Jones et al., Patterns in the Socioeconomic Characteristics of Women Obtaining Abortions in
2000-2001, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 226, 231-32 (2002),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/oumals/3422602.pdf.
18. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("Bowers was not correct
when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers
v. Hardvick should be and now is overruled.").
19. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581-84 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20. Perezv. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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Despite the Court's eschewing of an equal protection rationale,21 LGBT rights
organizations successfully framed Lawrence as a declaration of equality.22 The
fact that it formed a political, although not doctrinal, bridge to the first ruling by a
state's highest court that same-sex couples must be granted the right to marry
cemented that popular understanding.23 Lawrence remains the high watermark
of the LGBT equal rights movement to date.
Much like Lawrence, Roe v. Wade is also a liberty/equality compound. Roe's
holding that the liberty-based right to privacy encompasses the decision whether
to have an abortion stemmed from the Due Process Clause, rather than the Equal
Protection Clause, but it is understood socially as central to women's equality. By
the time Roe was decided, the abortion rights movement had migrated from its
historical origins in the efforts to legalize birth control dating from the early
twentieth century to serving as a key component of the mobilization of women
for the second wave of feminism.24 The Supreme Court opinion in Roe, even
cabined as it was by concern for physician decisionmaking, established the social
understanding that a woman's right to choose was at stake, not merely the de-
criminalization of a medical procedure. As the Court itself recognized in the Casey
opinion that reaffirmed much of Roe, control of one's reproductive capacity is
essential for women's ability to realize other life choices, whether as individuals,
workers, or citizens.2"
Roe, however, differs from Lawrence in important ways, because it involved
a far messier, more complex set of hierarchies than were present in the challenge
to sodomy laws. At issue in the abortion litigation was not just gender hierarchy
but also hierarchies of religious and professional medical authority. One marker
of the complexity of Roe's backstory is the broad range of legal arguments in the
amicus briefs filed in the case. These included arguments that prohibitions on
abortion constituted sex discrimination and discrimination based on poverty,26 as
21. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
22. Nicholas Pedriana, Intimate Equality: The Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Movements Legal
Framing of Sodomy Laws in the Lawrence v. Texas Case, in QUEER MOBILIZATIONS: LGBT
ACTIVISTS CONFRONT THE LAW 52 (Scott Barclay et al. eds., 2009).
23. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); f. Laurence H. Tribe,
Lawrence v. Texas: The 'Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1893, 1947 n.207 (2004) (noting that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court "relied heavily on
the equal respect dimension of the Lawrence analysis").
24. Cf, e.g., JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 314-15 (1988); Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, B~fore (andAfter)
Roe v. Wade: New QuestionsAbout Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2042-46 (2011).
25. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
26. See LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V WADE (2012), available at
http://documentslaw.yale.edu/sites/defautt/files/BeforeRoe2ndEd l.pdf, for a collection of the briefs
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well as Thirteenth Amendment and Establishment Clause arguments.27 The
Supreme Court did not rely on, or even acknowledge, any of these amicus briefs,
but the decision sub silentio disturbed multiple hierarchies, especially those in-
volving medical and religious establishments, in addition to the gendered control
of reproduction.
By contrast, Lawrence was litigated narrowly, carefully constructed to avoid
a challenge even to adultery laws, much less to laws banning prostitution or other
socially disfavored but consensual sexual acts.2" In one hierarchy of sexualities
(including queer and heterosexual identities), anthropologist Gayle Rubin placed
sex workers, transgender people, and consensual sadomasochist activists at the
bottom.29 The reality of this stratification remains in place post-Lawrence, and,
with the exception of transgender people, the groups who reside at the bottom
have moved very little if at all.
Lower federal courts have expanded the lacunae in the Lawrence opinion.
For example, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's statement in
Lawrence that the decision did not involve children to justify holding that the
liberty interest upheld in Lawrence was irrelevant to whether adoption rights could
be made contingent on whether the prospective parents engaged in homosexual
sex.3" Other courts have relied on the same language in Lawrence to find that
laws prohibiting commercial sexual acts are constitutionally permissible.31
Although Roe has been dogged by the problems associated with challenges
to hierarchy, I do not mean to argue that this one characteristic of Roe provides
the sole explanation for why it remains a political lightning rod forty years later.
That phenomenon is truly overdetermined, given that Roe was decided during an
extraordinarily turbulent historical moment. It was decided during a period that
was marked by the convergence of massive change in multiple arenas: a rev-
olution in the nonmarital sexual practices of young adults, the end of the Warren
filed in Roe, including a brief arguing that a prohibition on abortion was an unconstitutional discrim-
ination based on poverty, id. at 324-28.
27. See, e.g., id. at 339-46.
28. DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V TEXAS 184-89,
193-96 (2012).
29. See GAYLE S. RUBIN, Thinking Sex. Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in
DEVIATIONS: A GAYLE RUBIN READER 137,153 (2011).
30. See Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children &Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004),
reh'gdenied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005).
31. State v. Freitag, 130 P.3d 544, 545-46 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the defendant "reads
Lawrence too broadly"); People v. Williams, 811 N.E.2d 1197, 1198 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding
that a prostitution statute does not violate any fundamental right); State v. Thomas, 891 So. 2d
1233, 1237 (La. 2005) (stating that "there is no protected privacy interest in public, commercial
sexual conduct"). SeegenerallyJ. Kelly Strader, Lawrence's Criminal Law, 16 BERKELEYJ. CRIM.
L. 41 (2011).
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Court, the dawning realization that in Vietnam the United States had for the first
time lost a major military conflict, and the beginning of a realignment in electoral
politics driven by the Republican Party campaign to build a then-new coalition of
southern whites and northern social conservatives, including opponents of abortion.32
There is no way to prove the precise mechanisms through which these
various issues interacted, to such powerful effect. But the fact that demands to re-
verse Roe v. Wade became so dominant in, and instrumental to, the rise of con-
servative politics in the 1980s should tell us that its social meaning and resonance
far exceeded the bounds of a debate over decriminalization of a particular act or
even how to categorize fetal forms of life.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court today appears to understand the ending of exclusions
to be apex of its authority to conduct judicial review under the Equal Protection
Clause. It seems far less bothered than it once was by stark social hierarchy, and
more likely to accept that the benign operation of political and economic markets
will lead to the optimal point of resolution for contestations over status. The
rollback in affirmative action protections is merely one example. Judicial discourse
in the past thirty years has contributed to, rather than inhibited, the strangling of
egalitarian idealism in American culture.
This anti-civil rights tendency, however, is not written in stone. The last
thirty years is not the next thirty years. There are historical moments when social
and doctrinal change accelerates. For example, when the Court decided Roe in
1973, it had been only twelve years since it had ruled that a Florida law allowing
women to opt out easily from jury service rationally reflected women's predom-
inantly domestic role in society.33 In 2003, the Court reversed a constitutional
precedent of only seventeen years' standing when it decided Lawrence.
Today, it has been seventeen years since Congress enacted the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), prohibiting federal recognition of same-sex marriages
that are valid under state law.34 Perhaps the Court will resuscitate the charmed
32. See, e.g., D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 330-32, 347-49; Greenhouse & Siegel, supra
note 24, at 2052-67.
33. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) ('We cannot say that it is constitutionally im-
permissible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to conclude that a woman should be
relieved from the civic duty ofjury service unless she herself determines that such service is consistent
with her own special responsibilities.").
34. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)
and28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
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rhythm of the Hardwick-Lawrence sequence and rule this year that DOMA is un-
constitutional." If it does, another unjust exclusion will fall.
Even if that occurs, however, it will remain an uphill battle for social justice
advocates to dismantle the remaining hierarchy of sexualities and to achieve a ful-
ler legal and social understanding that the freedom to define and practice one's
sexuality is a civil right.
35. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. ranted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012),
which may produce an opinion analyzing whether the Defense of Marriage Act is constitutional.
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